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Abstract Politicians expect green public procurement (GPP) to serve as an envi-
ronmental policy instrument. However, in order for GPP to work as an effective policy
instrument, it is important to take into consideration potential suppliers’ decisions to
participate in the procurement process, the total number of bidders, and the screening
of bidders with respect to mandatory green criteria. The aim of this paper is to
empirically study GPP in this respect. The analysis presented here is based on data
from Swedish cleaning service procurements that are unique in that they contain very
detailed information on various environmental standards set by the contracting
authorities. We find at best only a weak effect on supplier behavior, and this suggests
that the use of GPP in this situation does not live up to its political expectations.
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1 Introduction
Green public procurement (GPP) means that authorities stipulate and consider
environmental criteria when public contracts are allocated to private suppliers and is
becoming an established approach to pursue environmental policy in many parts of
the world (Testa et al. 2012). The incentive to use GPP is based on the fact that in
many countries public sector spending amounts to a significant part of the economy,
and that this purchasing power can be used to influence production and consumption
to achieve desired reductions on environmental impact. For example, authorities
within the European Union (EU) annually spend on average 16 percent of the GDP
on the procurement of goods, services, and works (European Commission 2008).
The EU and its member states are very clear in their ambitions to use GPP as an
environmental policy instrument (Tukker et al. 2008), and similar initiatives can be
found in the US (Fischer 2010).
Despite the intended results, little is known about whether and how the supply
side of the market––potential private suppliers––reacts to these ambitions. This
paper seeks to fill this knowledge gap by providing an empirical analysis of how
GPP affects potential suppliers’ decisions to participate in public procurements.
From the theoretical literature, it is known that the function of GPP as a policy
instrument and its ability to fulfill––or to even contribute to––the achievement of
environmental objectives is conditioned on the market response to the GPP
procedures (Marron 1997; Lundberg and Marklund 2013a). In practice, participation
is optional and is contingent on potential suppliers’ expected pay-off from entering
into GPP schemes (e.g., Samuelson 1985; Levin and Smith 1994; Li and Zheng
2009). The feature of optionality distinguishes GPP from more traditional
environmental policy instruments such as emissions taxes.
More specifically, GPP means that authorities (e.g., a government authority, a
public county hospital, or a municipality) in addition to quality criteria stipulate and
consider environmental criteria when public contracts for public goods, services, or
works are allocated to private suppliers.1 The environmental criteria can be
associated with the intrinsic qualities of the contract as well as with the production
process itself. In the procurements studied here, competitive sealed bidding is used
to allocate the contracts and the selection of supplier is based on both environmental
concerns and price. The GPP process includes a screening of the bids against
mandatory green criteria, and only those bids that pass the screening qualify for the
next step in which a winner of the contract is designated.
Theoretically, GPP as an environmental policy can work as a substitution policy
(Marron 1997), a transformation policy (Lundberg and Marklund 2013a), or a
combination of the two. In the first case, the purchasing authority substitutes a
‘‘brown’’ (conventional) product to a less environmentally harmful (green)
alternative. The intention of a transformation policy is to encourage potential
suppliers to stop producing for the conventional market and to invest in less
1 The European Commission defines GPP as a procurement situation in which ‘‘… public authorities seek
to procure goods, services and works with a reduced environmental impact throughout their life-cycle
compared to goods, services and works with the same primary function that would otherwise be
procured.’’ See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/versus_en.htm.
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environmentally harmful technologies and to produce instead for the green market.
Both types of policy can have an effect on potential suppliers’ decisions to enter into
such agreements and to participate in specific procurements. This is of interest for at
least two reasons. First, competition is important because it is a determinant of
price. Simply put, the more the bidders are, the lower the price the authority will
have to pay. Second, who participates and how many participate in such
arrangements are important for the overall environmental pressure (Marron 1997,
Lundberg and Marklund 2013a). From an environmental policy point of view, it is
important that producers in the conventional market find it profitable to adapt to the
green criteria and to invest in less environmentally damaging technologies. If
procurements with environmental concerns only attract green suppliers, conven-
tional suppliers will continue to produce brown.
According to Li and Geiser (2005), GPP can generate or enlarge the market for
green products if public authorities are significant buyers.2 According to Marron
(1997), however, this is not a sufficient condition for GPP to reduce environmental
pressure and it can actually have the opposite effect. Through relative price changes,
a substitution policy can lead to private consumers substituting green products for
conventional products, and the public sector’s environmental policy strategy can
thus have a counter-productive substitution effect among private consumers. The net
environmental impact is determined by how price-sensitive producers and
consumers are. To assess the market reaction to GPP policies, it is thus essential
to explore the firm-level decision to participate in the GPP process––as well as the
aggregate number of bidders––and to relate this to procurements (contracts) with
various green criteria.
From an environmental policy point of view, it is important that the specifications
of environmental criteria are transparent and adequate with respect to specific
environmental objectives. The misunderstanding of criteria by potential suppliers is
associated with a risk of them deciding not to submit a bid or of them undertaking
non-optimal green investments, and this potential problem is the motivation for
analyzing the relationship between the GPP design and the qualification process.
Although GPP appears to be a well-established environmental policy instrument,
it is not well studied in the academic literature and, as pointed out by Testa et al.
(2012), this represents a relatively new area of research. There are studies that
describe national GPP initiatives (e.g., Swanson et al. 2005; Bolton 2008; Geng and
Doberstein 2008; Ho et al. 2010; Arvidsson and Stage 2012), provide guidelines
(e.g., Parika-Alhola 2008; Tarantini et al. 2011), or study GPP uptake (Walker and
Brammer 2009; Palmujoki et al. 2010; Testa et al. 2012), but none of these studies
have provided a theoretical or empirical understanding of how GPP works as an
environmental policy instrument.
Marron (1997) and Lundberg and Marklund (2013a, b) appear to be exceptions to
the lack of research on the role of GPP in environmental policy. In short, these
theoretical studies have identified shortcomings of GPP in terms of environmental
policy and its potential to lead to reduced environmental impact. The current paper
presented here adds to these previous studies by providing an empirical analysis of
2 This finding is empirical and based on interviews.
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GPP as an environmental policy instrument. Based on a unique and rich dataset
comprising procurements organized by Swedish authorities, it studies the effect of
GPP on potential suppliers’ decisions of whether or not to participate in the
procurement process, the degree of competition, and the likelihood of a bid being
disqualified.
The data were extracted from Swedish authorities’ procurements of internal
regular cleaning services from the years 2009 and 2010. For the 337 procurements,
we have information about the type of authority, the procurement design, the object
or facility to be cleaned, the contract and local market characteristics, all submitted
bids, and whether or not a bid met all of the mandatory qualification criteria. The
data also provide rich descriptions of the green criteria that are stipulated in each of
the procurements. In total, we can identify 28 different green criteria. Because
several of them are simply different ways of describing the same environmental
dimension, the criteria are categorized into six different green variables. The data
also describe the environmental dimension that the criteria aim to influence, such as
environmental management systems, vehicles, and the use of chemicals, as well as
other quality demands within the procurement.
Internal regular cleaning service contracts provide a good testing ground for
studying GPP for several reasons. Internal regular cleaning services are relatively
easy to contract and such services do not usually differ significantly in expected
quality. This facilitates the identification of the effects that different green criteria
have on participation. Further, the EU identifies cleaning products and services to be
suitable for implementing GPP as it is seen to have scope for environmental
improvement and potential impact on suppliers.3
The Swedish procurement rules and green procurement ambitions follow the EU
procurement directives (2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC) and the worldwide trend of
increased use of GPP. Our research question is thus of potential interest for all EU
member states as well as countries outside the EU that are using or are considering
using public purchasing as a means to pursue environmental policy.
Our main finding is that the design of GPP, i.e., the different categories of green
criteria, has only limited impact on the suppliers’ decisions to participate in the
process and on the aggregate number of bids. This applies regardless of whether the
suppliers are small or large. The qualification process further reveals that some
green criteria are associated with increased complexity as indicated by the reduced
probability of a bid becoming qualified when environmental management systems
or the regulation of chemical use is the criterion. Therefore, we find no general
support for the political expectations of GPP as an environmental policy instrument.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe GPP.
Section 3 formalizes the notions of entry and qualification and discusses these
concepts in light of GPP. In Sect. 4, a descriptive presentation of the data is
provided. Section 5 provides the empirical specifications and results, and Sect. 6
provides the conclusions of the study.
3 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/gpp_criteria_en.htm.
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2 Green public procurement
In public procurement, it is quite common that contracts are allocated based on
competitive sealed bidding. This is certainly the case in the procurements studied in
the current paper, and we assess public procurement as defined by the EU
procurement directives as: ‘‘…the measures implemented by a contracting authority
with the aim of awarding a contract or concluding a framework agreement regarding
products, services, or works’’ (Article 13). GPP is specifically defined as a situation
in which contracting authorities take environmental considerations into account
when buying products, services, or works (European Commission 2008).4 A
contracting authority is a public body that is subject to the procurement regulations
and is the buyer of the good, service, or works.
Following the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement
and EU procurement directives, competitive sealed bidding is generally used when
allocating public contracts. The procurement auction is initiated by publicly
announcing the call for tender. Amongst other things, the announcement specifies
the characteristics of the product to be procured as well as the contract conditions.
The call for tenders also includes technical specifications, green and other quality
criteria, and the principles for bid evaluation. A procurement auction can include
one or several lots (one contract per lot), and bidding is simultaneous but
independent over lots. That is, separate sealed bids are submitted on all or a subset
of the lots included in the same procurement. Each potential supplier is allowed to
submit one bid per lot, and contracts are assigned by lot (onwards contract).
Green criteria and other quality criteria can either be mandatory or optional. If
only price and mandatory qualification and exclusion criteria are used as the
allocation principle, the selection of the supplier is said to be based on the lowest
price. On the other hand, if green and quality criteria take the form of optional
award criteria and are accounted for in a scoring rule,5 the allocation of contracts is
based on the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT).6 This gives the
procurement the character of a multidimensional auction (e.g., Che 1993). The use
of MEAT can be combined with mandatory criteria, and this is often the case in
practice.
The bid evaluation process can be characterized by a two-step procedure
consisting of a qualification phase followed by a bid evaluation phase.7 In the first
step, each bidder is evaluated against a set of mandatory exclusion and qualification
4 Note that this definition does not include auctions of nature conservation contracts, e.g., Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997), Stoneham et al. (2003).
5 See, e.g., Dini et al. (2006), Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010), Lundberg and Marklund (2011) and
Bergman and Lundberg (2013).
6 Also known as economically most advantageous tender, EMAT.
7 The two-step evaluation procedure is, from the perspective of potential bidders, a simultaneous process.
A submitted bid includes prices, and the outcome of the qualification phase is made public at the same
time as the outcome of the bid evaluation phase. This is somewhat different from, e.g. Texas Department
of Transportation highway mowing auctions where the outcome of the qualification phase is known to the
bidders prior to them submitting their price bids (see Li and Zheng 2009).
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criteria.8 Bidders that fulfill the requirements qualify for the second and final step in
which bids are evaluated and a supplier is selected and assigned the contract.
Although the procurement process is regulated by law, implementation is
decentralized in the sense that it leaves the contracting authority a great deal of
freedom in exactly how to design the bid evaluation process and what environ-
mental qualification and award criteria to consider. The criteria must, however, be
linked to the subject matter of the contract and must comply with the general
principles stipulated in the EU Directives (2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC). The
principles, which aim to promote an effective EU-wide and cross-border compe-
tition for public contracts and to prevent corruption, include equal treatment,
transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, and mutual recognition. To
maximize business opportunities for companies within the EU internal market, all
procurements with a total contract value exceeding a predetermined threshold must
be advertised in the official database, Tenders Electronic Daily. The threshold value
for internal cleaning services is 414,000 EUR.9
The EU Directives allow contracting authorities to define what a product is made
of and how it is made in the technical specification of the procurement
announcement. Potential suppliers may, therefore, have to change their production
technology or the product itself to comply with the mandatory green criteria.
Irrespective of the criteria addressing the production process or the product, the
green criteria may target the use of resources or the negative effects of emissions
(see Lundberg and Marklund 2013b). The use of GPP can specifically address things
such as environmental management systems, references proving sustainability,
certificates, standards, biodiversity, emissions into the air and water, energy and
water consumption, chemical consumption, and waste generation (European
Commission 2011).
When implementing GPP, there is an element of discretion and potential
suppliers who do not meet the required environmental or quality standards can avoid
the cost of adjusting to the criteria by not participating in the procurement process.
When seeking to reduce emissions, GPP is, therefore, potentially weaker than taxes,
tradable permits, subsidies, and standards, although any form of environmental
regulation can lead to entry barriers (see, e.g., Heyes 2009 for a survey).
Consequently, understanding the functioning of GPP as an environmental policy
instrument in terms of objective effectiveness demands insights into how GPP
affects potential suppliers’ decisions to participate as well as the probability that a
bidder will meet the mandatory criteria. For instance, the cost to adapt to
environmental criteria may differ between potential suppliers depending on whether
they have already made environmental investments or not, i.e., there may be
systematic a priori cost asymmetries in adapting to the criteria. GPP policies might,
therefore, give ‘‘greener’’ suppliers competitive advantages that induce them to
8 Exclusion criteria deal with circumstances such as bankruptcy, serious misconduct, unpaid taxes, or
social security contributions that normally prevent contracting authorities from carrying out any business
with firms. For instance, companies that repeatedly breach environmental laws can be excluded on the
grounds of grave professional misconduct (2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC).
9 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/rules/current/index_en.htm.
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participate to a greater extent. The empirical analysis presented here provides
insights on these issues.
3 Supplier response to GPP
The general aim of this paper is to empirically study the market reaction to GPP,
and a crucial aspect in this context is the individual potential supplier’s decision on
whether to participate in the procurement process or not. This decision is assumed to
be contingent on the stringency of the environmental criteria in a given procurement
relative to the technological status of the potential supplier.10 To have any
environmental impact, the number of suppliers that actually adapt to these criteria
also becomes crucial. A potential supplier who meets the environmental standards
without any adjustments is said to be a producer of the environmentally preferable
product. A potential supplier who to comply with the environmental demands needs
to adjust its production process produces a competing product with more impact on
the environment than is socially desirable but otherwise serving the same purpose.
Another aspect of GPP deals with the qualification process and the evaluation of
bids. Transparent and adequately designed criteria that correspond well to the
targeted environmental objectives will most likely facilitate participation and also
benefit the environment. Non-transparent or inadequate criteria could potentially
result in reduced participation or non-optimal green investments by potential
suppliers. This section includes a simple theoretical framework addressing these
aspects.
3.1 The potential supplier’s participation decision
It is assumed that a potential supplier decides to participate in a given procurement
process and submit a bid if the expected pay-off of doing so is non-negative. A bid
typically consists of a price bid and a detailed description of how the bid complies
with the green criteria that are specified in the call for tender. Preparing and
submitting a bid is, therefore, associated with a bid preparation cost. Also, if a
potential supplier does not comply with the criteria at the time when the call for
tender is announced the supplier has to consider the cost of adapting to them. These
costs affect the expected pay-off from participating (e.g., Li and Zheng 2009;
Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2011), and they are here treated together as a
participation cost (kim).
It is also reasonable to regard potential suppliers as being heterogeneous in their
ex ante environmental performance (e.g., green and conventional suppliers), and
their costs for adapting to green criteria will differ (Lundberg and Marklund 2013b).
That is, for a given procurement, kim will differ across potential suppliers due to
different adaption costs. The green criteria are (following practice) specified on the
10 Environmental criteria henceforth include both mandatory qualification criteria and optional award
criteria.
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procurement level (m), and as such constant over the contracts auctioned in one and
the same procurement.
Preparation and adaption costs are likely to increase with the number of green
criteria, their stringency, and their complexity. It is, therefore, reasonable to regard
the decision to participate in the procurement process as endogenously determined
by the green criteria.11 The potential supplier’s decision to participate can be said to
be determined by the following condition:
E pijm




Pr winningð Þ  kim 0 ð1Þ
which states that a potential supplier i = 1,…, N will submit a bid, bijm, on contract
j = 1,…, J in procurement m = 1,…, M if the expected pay-off from doing so,
E(pijm), is non-negative. The expected profit is also determined by the potential
supplier’s private production cost, cijm, and the likelihood of winning the contract.
See, e.g., Milgrom (2004) for further details.
Consequently, the expected profit will vary across potential suppliers. It follows
from Eq. (1) that potential supplier i will submit a bid when the underlying
continuous expected net profit function, pijm, is non-negative, i.e.,
pijm ¼ E pijm
  ¼ V xi; sj; zm
  0 ð2Þ
where VðÞ is a function that links the potential supplier’s participation decision to
its expected net profit. It includes a vector of supplier-specific variables, xi, contract
characteristics, sj, and procurement characteristics, zm.
The underlying expected net profit in Eq. (2) is not directly observed, but the
binary outcome variable, yijm, is observed with yijm = 1 if pijm[ 0. Hence, the
participation decision rule is specified generally as follows:
yijm ¼ 1 if pijm ¼ V xi; sj; zm
  0 ð3Þ
.
That is, yijm takes a value of one if potential supplier i is observed to submit a bid
on contract j in procurement m and is zero otherwise.12
In accordance with a transformation policy, a given procurement process
contributes to reduced environmental impact when potential suppliers adapt to the
green criteria specified in the call for tender and invest in environmentally friendlier
production processes and products. If only potential suppliers that already comply
with the criteria decide to participate in the procurement process, there will be no
11 See Samuelson (1985) and Levin and Smith (1994) for more reading on endogenous entry.
12 To be able to identify the underlying expected profit function in Eq. (2), through the potential
supplier’s observed decision to participate in the procurement process in Eq. (3), we assume that the
participation decisions of bidder i and -i (where i 6¼ i) are independent of each other. Independence is
implied theoretically by the assumption of the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) cost
parameters and the assumption that the bid strategy, bijm ¼ b cijm
 
, is strictly increasing in cijm (e.g.
Milgrom 2004). Then, for a given participation cost, kim, participation is independent across bidders and
this is consistent with the single-agent model originally proposed by McFadden (1974).
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environmental impact as long as they do not displace conventional suppliers from
the market.
3.2 Number of bidders
The aggregate of individual participation decisions described by Eq. (1) corre-
sponds to the degree of competition, i.e., the number of actual bidders on each
contract. Therefore, it is also relevant to study the relationship between GPP and the
number of bidders. A potential supplier who has submitted a bid is defined as a
bidder.
Following Lundberg et al. (2012), and assuming that the cost of adapting to green
criteria increases at an increasing rate as the stringency of the criteria increases, the
relation between the stringency of green criteria and the number of bidders is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
For simplicity, we assume that all N potential suppliers prior to the procurement
process are conventional suppliers and that they have different production
technologies. All of them contribute to emissions but to varying degrees. If the
contracting authority stipulates green criteria corresponding to some environmental
standard, GPP0m (aiming for a specific environmental objective (c
*), e.g., reduced
carbon emissions), it follows that N - n0 potential suppliers will refrain from
bidding. However, we can also assume that the contracting authority foresees this
and, based on n0 and the environmental objective c*, stipulates even tougher criteria
GPP1m[GPP
0
m. Consequently, the tougher GPP level increases the required per
Fig. 1 The relationship between the stringency of green criteria and the number of actual bidders for a
specific environmental objective c* (see Lundberg et al. 2012)
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bidder adaption cost and N - n1 bidders will drop out. Accordingly, participation
decreases at an increasing rate as the criteria become more stringent. All things
being equal, a procurement without green criteria would imply zero adaption cost
and the number of bidders would be equal to the number of potential conventional
suppliers. No environmental improvements will result from this particular
procurement process and the environmental objective, c*, will not be achieved or
even contributed to. Paradoxically, this is the same outcome as would occur under a
scenario with green criteria and participation from only potential suppliers that prior
to the procurement process already comply with the criteria (as long as they do not
displace conventional suppliers), i.e., green suppliers. Here, we empirically study
the relationship between the stringency of green criteria and the number of bidders
at the contract level according to njm = G(sj, zm).
3.3 Screening and qualification
When the bidding process is over, all bidders are screened against the mandatory
criteria in a first step. Bidders that for some reason do not fulfill the mandatory
criteria are disqualified. In a second step, the qualified bidders are evaluated with
respect to the award criteria, including the price.13
From an environmental policy point of view, it is important that the contracting
authority specifies transparent and adequate green criteria according to some
predetermined environmental objective.14 Misinterpretation of criteria on behalf of
potential suppliers is associated with a risk of them making the wrong participation
decision, i.e., deciding to not participate instead of participating or vice versa. Also,
once deciding to participate, there is a risk of them not undertaking the green
investments in the manner desired by the contracting authority and, therefore, they
will be disqualified. Unclear criteria not only violate the principle of transparency,
but they also compromise the ability of GPP to have the desired environmental
effect simply because the authority (the regulator) and bidders (the regulated) do not
agree on the exact nature of the stipulated green criteria.
Formally, let qi in the interval [q; q] denote a value that reflects the outcome of
screening bidder i against the mandatory criteria. Following Wan and Beil (2009),
bidder i is assumed to be qualified if the value is weakly larger than a predetermined
qualification threshold value as indexed by q0m, i.e., if qi q0m. Furthermore, with qi
distributed according to HðÞ, the probability of bidder i becoming qualified is
expressed by
qim ¼ 1  Hðq0mÞ ð4Þ
where qim is strictly decreasing in qm
0 . Simply stated, all things equal, the more
complex the criteria the less likely bidder i is to qualify. The strictness of the
qualification threshold can now be re-expressed as q0m ¼ q qimð Þ  H1 1  qimð Þ.
13 This approach is different from what is known in the literature as pre-qualification, which is a situation
in which the screening occurs prior to the bidding (e.g. Wan and Beil 2009).
14 The criteria should reflect the preferences of the part of society the contracting authority represents
(see Lundberg and Marklund 2011).
496 Environ Econ Policy Stud (2015) 17:487–520
123
Furthermore, bidder i’s underlying ability to qualify is denoted by qim ¼
qi  q0m 0 and is not directly observed in the data. Instead, the binary outcome
variable of actually being qualified or not, dim, is observed with dim = 1 if q

im 0.
Hence, the selection rule is specified generally as follows:
dim ¼ 1 if qim ¼ H xi; zmð Þ 0 ð5Þ
where H() is a function of supplier-level characteristics, xi, and procurement-level
characteristics, zm.
4 The data
Our data consist of internal regular cleaning service procurements from the years
2009 and 2010.15 Internal regular cleaning service contracts are chosen because they
provide a good testing ground for GPP. It is a relatively easy service to contract for,
it is not associated with severe capacity constraints, and it does not differ much in
quality prior to the procurement process. This facilitates identification of the effects
of different green criteria on the potential suppliers’ decisions of whether to
participate in the procurement process. Another reason for using data from internal
regular cleaning service procurements is that the EU has identified cleaning
products and services as one of the 20 prioritized sectors. These sectors were,
among other things, selected based on their scope for environmental improvement
and impact on suppliers.16
Information about the procurements was obtained from a national database in
which call-for-tender notices are advertised in Sweden.17 In addition to the basic
information about the procurement, information was extracted from procurement
documents such as the call for tender itself, the technical specification, the tender
compilation, and records of the procurement decision. The technical specifications
are very detailed about how, with what materials, and how often the facilities are to
be cleaned. Information about the potential suppliers and local market character-
istics is collected from Statistics Sweden (SCB).
The dataset consists of 337 procurement auctions comprising 722 contracts on
which a total of 4,699 bids were placed. One contract can comprise one or several
premises to be cleaned. We can identify 341 unique potential suppliers in the data
(see footnote 26) and 153 of these are never disqualified.
4.1 Procurement and market characteristics (zm)
Procurement and market characteristics, zm, include a wide range of different
characteristics, including green criteria as well as other criteria addressing quality
aspects of the cleaning service and the production of the same. The criteria are
15 Three procurements in the dataset were carried out in late December 2008.
16 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/gpp_criteria_en.htm.
17 Visma Commerce AB. This is the largest such data base in Sweden and it covers approximately 90
percent of all procurements.
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divided into qualification and award criteria and are constant over contracts
auctioned in one and the same procurement. Of particular focus in this study are
green criteria. Detailed information about these was collected from the call for
tender, and 28 unique green criteria were identified.18 The number of different green
criteria varies across procurements and ranging from no criteria to 17 criteria (see
the left diagram in Fig. 2).
To reduce the dimensionality in the empirical analysis, we categorized the 28
observed green criteria into six main characteristics to be included in the
procurement and market variables vector, zm.
The variable Environmental management system (EMS) condenses information
on criteria that are related to environmental measures that potential suppliers do not
have to implement by law, i.e., having an environmental management system,
obtaining environmental certificates, and fulfilling different ISO 14000 standards.19
Eco labeling (ECO) is also voluntary and concerns ecological labeling of cleaning
products (e.g., the EU Ecolabel or equivalent). Vehicle (VEH) includes criteria
stipulating emission standards for cars (e.g., Euroclass,20 fuel specifics, eco driving,
etc). Criteria that require the supplier to follow the Swedish Chemicals Agency
B-list,21 the Swedish Environmental Code, the decree on Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),22 the Swedish Chemicals
Agency Code of Statutes 2008, and similar regulations are classified as being
chemical criteria (CHEM). At this point, all criteria but VEH are quite frequently
being represented in the procurements. In only 10 percent of the procurements, the
authority signals that it intends to monitor that the supplier delivers according to the
environmental concerns stipulated in the contract (see Table 1). This criterion is
defined as Eco monitoring (MON). Finally, other types of criteria, e.g.,
recommendations by the Swedish Environmental Management Council and allergy
considerations, are included in the other eco demands (OTHER) category.
18 Descriptive statistics of the green criteria are given in ‘‘Appendix 1’’, Table 4.
19 According to the web page for ISO: ‘‘ISO 14001:2004 sets out the criteria for an environmental
management system and can be certified to. It does not state requirements for environmental
performance, but maps out a framework that a company or organization can follow to set up an
effective environmental management system. It can be used by any organization regardless of its activity
or sector. Using ISO 14001:2004 can provide assurance to company management and employees as well
as external stakeholders that environmental impact is being measured and improved.’’ http://www.iso.org/
iso/iso14000.
20 Within the EU, there are emission standards defining acceptable limits for exhaust emissions of
different types of new vehicles (cars included) sold in the member states. These standards include
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), total hydrocarbon (THC), non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHC),
carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM). See the European Commission website: http://ec.
europa.eu/environment/air/transport/road.htm.
21 See the Swedish Chemical Agency website: http://www.kemi.se/.
22 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),
establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council
Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive
76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC, and 2000/21/EC. http://ec.
europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/index_en.htm.
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We can also identify 26 unique quality criteria that do not relate to environmental
quality, e.g., those that relate to the performance of the cleaning service itself, the
financial status of the potential supplier, tax certificates, employees’ qualifications,
union rights, etc. As illustrated in the diagram to the right in Fig. 2, the number of
different quality criteria varies across procurements and ranging from 3 to 17
criteria. On average, the authorities stipulate more qualitative criteria (11.1) than
green criteria (4.5). Again, to reduce the dimensionality in the empirical analysis,
we categorize the 26 observed quality criteria into six main variables23 (see
Table 2).
Financial status (FIN) relates to criteria with the goal of ensuring that the
supplier’s financial condition is solid (e.g., annual reports or information on
turnover). It is also quite common that the authorities formulate criteria to ensure
that the suppliers have relevant insurance, and these are included in the insurance
(INS) variable. The experience (EXP) variable includes criteria demanding potential
suppliers to prove them having relevant experience with similar assignments.
Performance plan (PER) refers to criteria that demand the potential supplier to
provide an implementation plan, i.e., a description of how the cleaning service
contract will be carried out. Social criteria (SOC) include the criteria that the
potential supplier needs to have collective labor agreements with the union, etc.
Finally, staffing (STAF) is a variable that includes criteria describing the
qualifications of the employees.
So far we have only discussed green criteria and quality criteria, but other
procurement characteristics will also be controlled for in the empirical analysis and
these are listed in Table 2. We have information on whether the contracting
authority is a local government (municipal) or not (MUNI). As mentioned earlier, a
contracting authority can award contracts based on either of two principles, lowest
price or MEAT (MEAT). In our data, both principles occur equally as frequently.
The size of the procurement may also be of importance based on its attractiveness in
terms of monetary value and economies of scales in potential suppliers’ production.
Procurement size is most likely positively correlated with the production cost,
modeled as cijm in Eq. (1), and we include two different size indicators, the number
of contracts included in one and the same procurement (#SUBC) and the area to be
Table 1 Variables summarizing the green criteria identified in the call for tenders
Green variables Mean Min. Max. Std. dev Obs
Environmental management system (EMS) 0.61 0 1 0.49 337
Eco labeling (ECO) 0.62 0 1 0.49 337
Vehicles (VEH) 0.03 0 1 0.17 337
Chemicals (CHEM) 0.72 0 1 0.45 337
Eco monitoring (MON) 0.10 0 1 0.31 337
Other eco demands (OTHER) 0.48 0 1 0.50 337
23 Descriptive statistics of all the quality criteria listed in the call for tenders are given in ‘‘Appendix 1,’’
Table 4. The most frequently used quality criterion is the requirement of limited liability insurance, which
is included in the variable insurance (see ‘‘Appendix 1,’’ Table 4).
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cleaned in square meters (#SQMP). Both measures are justified because a high total
value on the procurement level can be explained by a single large contract as well as
by many small contracts.
The average number of contracts within one and the same procurement is 2.21
and varies between 1 and 51. Also, the total area to be cleaned varies considerably
and is on average approximately 20,000 m2.
4.2 Contract characteristics (sj)
The contract characteristics, sj, include variables that are unique for each contract,
such as the type of premises to be cleaned (SCHOOL, OFFICE, OTHER) and its
size measured in square meters (#SQMC). Most of the contracts concern cleaning of
schools (30 %) and offices (52 %).
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on procurement, contract, and supplier variables
Variable Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Obs.
Procurement level
Financial status (FIN) 0.96 0 1 0.19 337
Insurance (INS) 0.93 0 1 0.25 337
Experience (EXP) 0.91 0 1 0.29 337
Performance plan (PER) 0.98 0 1 0.15 337
Social criteria (SOC) 0.33 0 1 0.47 337
Staffing (STAF) 0.89 0 1 0.31 337
Type of contracting authority, municipality
(MUNI)
0.50 0 1 0.50 337
Award method (MEAT) 0.50 0 1 0.50 337
Number of contracts per procurement (#SUBC) 2.21 1 51 4.26 337
Total area to be cleaned, square meters (#SQMP) 19,677.01 40 884,000 65,156.68 337
Contract level
Type of facilitya
School 0.30 0 1 0.46 722
Office 0.52 0 1 0.50 722
Other 0.46 0 1 0.50 722
Additional services index (SERVICE) 2.39 0 4 1.20 722
Area to be cleaned, square meters (#SQMC) 9,196.90 26.90 403,658 27,178.43 722
Potential suppliers
Headquarters is in the same labor market area
(LMA) as the delivery site (HEADQ)
0.71 0 1 0.45 30,000
Limited liability firms (corporations) (LTD) 0.80 0 1 0.40 301
Class size (SCB definition) (SIZE) 4.79 0 16 3.15 301
Number of potential bidders by region (Njm) 14.27 2 174 23.58 56
Number of received bids per procurement (nm) 7.11 1 37 4.70 337
Number of qualified bids (njm) 5.62 1 23 3.13 722
a Note that one contract can include a multiple set of premises to be cleaned
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In addition to the regular cleaning service, the contracting authority sometimes
demands optional services that require more resources and, therefore, might have an
impact on the potential suppliers’ decision to participate and, consequently, on the
number of bids. For instance, special equipment is required for additional services
such as window cleaning and floor cleaning, which occur in 55 and 74 % of the
contracts, respectively, in our dataset. Other additional services are periodic
cleaning and the provision of consumables such as hygiene material. In the
estimations, we measure additional service as an index (SERVICE) by counting the
number of additional services included in each contract. As can be seen from
Table 2, the number of additional services is on average 2.40 per contract. Finally,
the areas to be cleaned vary considerably between contracts and are on average
about 9,000 m2.
4.3 Potential supplier-specific variables (xj) and the set of potential suppliers
The vector xj includes variables on characteristics that are unique for each potential
supplier. The first one is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the potential
suppliers have their headquarters located in the same labor market area (LMA),24,25
as the premises to be cleaned (HEADQ). This is the case for about 71 % of the
potential suppliers. The second variable is corporate form (LTD). This variable takes
a value of one if the firm is a limited company, which 80 % the potential
suppliers are. Finally, firm size (SIZE) is measured by dividing the potential
suppliers into 16 size classes with respect to the number of employees according to
the definition of SCB. See Table 5 in ‘‘Appendix 1’’. The average potential supplier
is a firm with 20–49 employees.
In the estimations, we also include different measures of competition. The first
variable, Njm, is the number of potential suppliers per LMA. A firm is defined as a
potential supplier in a specific LMA if it is observed in our data as a bidder on at
least one contract in that LMA (a similar approach can be found in Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer 2000, 2003). The average number of potential suppliers in a LMA is
approximately 14, see Table 2.26
The second variable related to competition is the number of received bids, nm,
and is measured at the procurement level. As shown in Table 2, it varies between 1
and 37 with a mean of 7.11. Finally, the number of qualified bids per contract, njm, is
5.62 on average.
24 Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000, 2003) estimate the suppliers’ decisions of participation, i.e., their
entry decisions, in a dynamic setting by taking so-called backlog into account.
25 The concept of the LMA is based on the observed commuting patterns of workers in Sweden. Different
communities are tied to a particular LMA if they are highly intertwined by commuting services and thus
form a homogeneous area of commerce (see SCB).
26 It is not straightforward to define the set of potential suppliers; it may influence the results as a supplier
can be interested in contracts outside the LMA in which the supplier is located. As a robustness check, we
extend the set of potential suppliers to cover all distinct suppliers in the sample. This results in Njm ¼ 341
potential suppliers for each contract and is discussed more below and in ‘‘Appendix 3.’’ Note that the 341
potential suppliers are all the firms observed in our data, i.e., all firms that have submitted a bid in any
Swedish public procurement for internal cleaning services in 2009 and 2010.
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Figure 3 illustrates the correlation between the number of green criteria in one
and the same procurement and the number of bidders (to the left) and the number of
qualified bidders per contract (to the right).
It is not clear from Fig. 3 what effect to expect from GPP (as measured by the
number of green criteria) on the number of bidders and the number of bids
submitted by qualified bidders. Visually, there is a weak positive relationship
between GPP and the number of bidders, but the scatter plot to the right indicates a
weak negative relationship between GPP and the number of bids. If anything, this
illustrates the importance of analyzing the effect of GPP on competition when
procurement, market, contract, and potential supplier characteristics are held
constant.
5 Empirical analysis
As shown in Sect. 3, a first step to empirically evaluate green public procurement as
an environmental policy instrument is to evaluate how green criteria affect the
potential suppliers’ decisions to participate in the procurement process. By
approximating the full set of potential suppliers for a given contract as those
suppliers in the data that entered a bid within the same LMA at least once, the
participation decision modeled in Eq. (3) is estimated as a logit model at the
contract level with the following specification27:
yijm ¼ ai þ b01xi þ b02sj þ b03zm þ b4Njm þ eijm ð6Þ
where yijm is a binary variable taking a value of one if potential supplier i has placed
a bid on contract j in procurement m. The b:s are the parameter vectors to be
estimated, and eijm represents unobserved circumstances that affect the probability
that potential supplier i submits a bid.
The xi vector includes characteristics of the potential supplier, such as SIZE and
LTD; see Table 2. If there are any economies of scale among the suppliers, the size
variable will capture this. The green variables that are included in the vector of
procurement characteristics, zm, i.e., EMS, ECO, VEH, CHEM, MON, and OTHER,
are defined as dummy variables.28 They are supposed to capture to what extent
green criteria affect the expected profitability of potential suppliers participating in
the procurement process, of which the cost of adapting to criteria is one component
in the participation cost, kim [Eq. (1)]. The zm vector also contains interaction
variables that are supposed to capture whether potential suppliers of different sizes
respond differently to green criteria. Also included in zm is a dummy variable for
MEAT that distinguishes procurements with only mandatory green qualification
criteria (lowest price) from those with only award criteria or award criteria
combined with mandatory criteria.
27 The model is estimated at the contract level because the decision about which contracts to bid on
implicitly determines the participation at the procurement level.
28 All six dummy variables are included in the estimations because the green criteria they capture are not
mutually exclusive.
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Supplier fixed effects (ai) are included to capture heterogeneities among potential
suppliers that are not captured by the variables SIZE and LTD (Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer 2003), e.g., differences in production technologies and processes. This
means that any unobserved differences in technologies and processes related to
environmental performance are controlled for. Therefore, if the coefficients for the
green variables show a significant negative sign, it indicates that the green criteria
are restrictive and lower the probability that potential brown suppliers will
participate in the procurement process. Green potential suppliers by definition fulfill
the environmental adjustments without making any adjustments. In this case, it
cannot be ruled out that GPP in the form of a transformation policy has positive
environmental effects. However, if there are no significant or positive significant
relationships between green criteria, the probability of participation indicates that
there is no cost for adapting to the criteria. In this case, the transformation policy has
failed to fulfill its purpose to spur potential suppliers to make environmental
investments. However, a positive relationship indicates that more of the potential
suppliers that a priori fulfill the green criteria are given incentives to participate
because the contracting authority signals that it values the environment and is
willing to pay a price preference. That is, already green suppliers with a higher unit
cost in production are attracted to a greater extent and the transformation policy has
actually become a substitution policy in accordance with Marron (1997). Other
variables related to supplier, contract, and procurement characteristics, as defined in
the data section, are used as controls (See Table 6 in ‘‘Appendix 2’’).
The number of potential suppliers, Njm, is included in Eq. (6). This number varies
across procurements and potentially also across contracts. Holding everything else
constant, the participation probability is expected to decrease as the number of
potential suppliers increases analogously with Li and Zheng (2009).
As discussed in Sect. 3, the aggregate of all the potential suppliers’ individual
decisions to participate in the procurement process (and bid on one or more
contract) or not is one factor that determines the possibilities for GPP working as an
environmental policy instrument. The decision to submit a bid is made on the
contract level because contracts in one and the same procurement are auctioned
individually. It is, therefore, relevant to estimate the effect of green criteria on the
number of bidders at the contract level29:
njm ¼ a0 þ b01sj þ b02zm þ b3Njm þ ejm ð7Þ
Because njm is a count variable, Eq. (7) is estimated using a zero-truncated
negative binomial regression model.30 The included variables are motivated as
described above. Note, however, that the number of bidders is expected to increase
along with the number of potential suppliers. Because estimations are conducted on
aggregate levels, the variables capturing the bidders’ size, interaction effects, and
29 One and the same procurement might include more than one contract. They are not identical and vary
in terms of area to be cleaned, geographic region, and the type of object to be cleaned. Further, the
potential suppliers have the option of bidding on one or several of the contracts.
30 We utilized a zero-truncated negative binomial regression model for the reasons that no bid count was
zero and also because a fitted Poisson regression model showed signs of overdispersion.
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fixed effects are not relevant in this case. The ejm term represents unobserved
circumstances that affect the number of bidders and the number of bids on the
contract level.
Another important aspect of including green criteria in public procurement is the
qualification process. For instance, misinterpretations of green criteria by the
bidders can lead to received bids being disqualified if they have not adapted to these
criteria as desired by the contracting authority (see Sect. 3). Therefore, the
relationship between green criteria and the probability of being qualified is
estimated in a logit framework at the procurement level as follows31:
dim ¼ ai þ b01xi þ b02zm þ b3nm þ eim ð8Þ
where dim is a binary variable as previously explained [see Eq. (5)]. The included
variables are motivated in the same way as in Eq. (6) except that the number of
potential bidders has been replaced with the number of received bids, nm. The eim
captures unobserved differences in bidder and procurement characteristics.
5.1 Results
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of main interest from Eqs. (6) to (8), i.e.,
models 1–3.32 For a full presentation of the results, see Table 6 in ‘‘Appendix 2.’’
The overall impression is that environmental concern in public procurement
regarding cleaning services in Sweden during 2009 and 2010 was not effective as an
environmental policy instrument.
The one exception is the coefficient for EMS, which shows a consistent impact
throughout all models in Table 3. A negative impact on suppliers’ decisions on
whether to participate in procurement auctions (Model 1) and on the number of bids
at the contract level (Model 2) indicate that these systems are costly to implement.
This result might seem logical considering that environmental certificates come with
a price tag. However, an environmental management system need not be formally
certified to fulfill the EMS criteria. Potential suppliers can present their systems in
their own prepared documents as long as the systems are in accordance with
certified equivalents. However, this might be an explanation for the significant
negative effect on the probability that received bids are being qualified (Model 3).
The contents of a system might be insufficient and, therefore, not meet the formal
requirements for certification. Also, the supplier’s self-prepared documents can be
difficult to interpret by the buyer due to poor presentation. Thus, the EMS criterion
potentially adds complexity and non-transparency to the procurement process.
It is difficult to draw any conclusion about the environmental impact from the
EMS criterion in the procurements studied here. On the one hand, the negative
impact on the participation decision is promising because it indicates that there are
31 Equation (8) is estimated at the procurement level because the screening of bidders is performed
irrespective of how many contracts a bidder has placed a bid on.
32 We have checked the pairwise correlations among the independent variables to see if our models suffer
from multicollinearity problems and find no sign of multicollinearity, except for the interaction variables,
which is expected. The correlation matrix is available from the authors upon request.
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potential suppliers that need to adapt to the criterion to be allowed to participate in
the procurement process. Some of them, therefore, refrain from adapting because it
costs too much. This is also supported by the negative impact on the number of bids
at the contract level. On the other hand, environmental management systems and
certificates concern the potential supplier’s organization, not the actual emissions
from its production process including inputs (see footnote 19). Together with the
negative effect on qualification, the EMS criterion makes GPP a vague and unclear
environmental policy instrument.
In contrast to the EMS criterion, the only criterion with no significant effect
throughout all models is other eco demands (OTHER). However, this particular
variable includes criteria that might differ considerably with respect to the
environmental problems that they aim to address, and it is possible that a criterion
with a significant positive effect is neutralized by other criteria with significant
negative effects.
Table 3 Estimation results
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Participation Competition Qualification
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef SE
EMS -0.419* 0.246 -0.254*** 0.081 -1.469*** 0.457
ECO 0.457* 0.243 -0.008 0.065 -0.181 0.434
VEH -0.048 0.359 0.329** 0.152 -1.491 2.172
CHEM 0.226 0.234 -0.042 0.066 -1.025** 0.440
MON 0.152 0.277 0.164 0.128 2.114** 0.977
OTHER 0.143 0.237 -0.084 0.073 -0.398 0.419
SIZE 0.260** 0.119 – - -0.031 0.310
EMS and SIZE 0.009 0.025 - - 0.112** 0.052
ECO and SIZE -0.046* 0.026 - - 0.011 0.051
VEH and SIZE 0.052 0.039 - - 0.187 0.300
CHEM and SIZE -0.032 0.028 - - 0.113** 0.051
MON and SIZE 0.025 0.030 - - -0.061 0.121
OTHER and SIZE -0.023 0.026 - - 0.018 0.052
MEAT (Yes = 1) 0.021 0.087 0.031 0.067 -0.124 0.177
Njm -0.013*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 - –
nm - - - - -0.008 0.020
Potential supplier fixed effects Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,000 722 1,861
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.080 0.260
Note that standard errors are clustered on procurement level in Model 1 and Model 2
* p\ 0.10, ** p\ 0.05, *** p\ 0.01
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If we look more closely at the three estimated models in Table 3, we see both
significant positive and negative effects from green criteria that contribute jointly to
the models.33 In Model 1, besides the negative coefficient for EMS, the coefficient
for ECO indicates a significant positive effect on the potential suppliers’ probability
of participating in procurement processes. Eco labels are in general associated with
inputs that are not directly associated with the supplier that provides the cleaning
service, e.g., the content of the cleaning materials. Demanding eco labels should
primarily attract potential suppliers that already use certified inputs, and this is a
signal that the extra cost for having certified inputs will pay off in terms of higher
expected profit from participating in the procurement process. However, while ECO
criteria increased the probability of potential suppliers deciding to participate in
procurement processes, this does not necessarily mean that the number of bidders at
the contract level increases, as indicated by Model 2. Finally, the coefficient for the
eco labeling types of criteria does not indicate any significant effect on the
probability of becoming qualified in Model 3. These types of criteria are relatively
easy to understand and to report and, as such, qualification should not be affected.
In Model 2, the coefficient related to VEH (e.g., Euroclass, fuel specifics and eco
driving) indicates positive significant effect on the number of bids at the contract
level. Again, it can be interpreted as those potential suppliers that already fulfill the
criteria are attracted to a larger extent. The positive effect suggests that demanding
environmental standards related to vehicles is associated with increased competition
and the EU regulations regarding vehicles could be the contributing factor to this
outcome. Potential suppliers with relatively new vehicle fleets find it more profitable
to participate in procurements where this investment will be rewarded.
As the estimated Model 3 indicates, the screening of bids against the criterion
related to chemical use and legislation (CHEM) seems problematic from the
bidders’ point of view. The coefficient is negative and significant, i.e., chemical
demand increases the probability of bids being disqualified. This criterion seems to
add complexity, and it leads to the bidders either misunderstanding the criteria or
not presenting their chemical standards clearly enough for the contracting
authorities. In this case, because the coefficient for the chemical criterion is
insignificant in all the other models, the explanation might be that the potential
suppliers do not understand this criterion and, therefore, do not realize how
demanding it is. Therefore, the criterion does not make the suppliers change their
behavior.
Also indicated by the estimated Model 3, and in contrast to CHEM, a significant
positive coefficient for MON indicates that monitoring increases the probability of
bids being qualified. A signal to potential suppliers that the contracting authority
aims at monitoring the environmental quality of the service performed can be
received as a sign of seriousness. Therefore, one interpretation would be that the
bids are of higher quality when monitoring is one of the criteria.
In conclusion, we can say that GPP has not had any general effective impact on
suppliers’ behavior within the Swedish cleaning service sector.
33 Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the six green criteria are jointly zero for Models 1–3 produce the
p values according to 0.0226, 0.0220, and 0.0025, respectively.
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However, there are other aspects of interest. Table 3 shows that the larger
potential suppliers are more likely to participate in procurement processes. A natural
extension of the discussion is to look at the combined effect of potential suppliers’
size in terms of number of employees and different green criteria, which we will do
below. The fact that the regression models are non-linear complicates the
interpretation of the interaction effects because they cannot be reduced to a single
number (Greene 2010). The marginal effects on the dependent variable of the GPP
variables vary over the support of SIZE; hence, a graphical approach is needed. See
Figs. 4 and 5, respectively.
The effects of the interaction between the green variables and the SIZE variable
on the potential suppliers’ probability to participate in a procurement are shown in
Fig. 4. For example, the top left panel of the figure illustrates the marginal effect of
EMS on the probability of entry and the 95 percent confidence interval includes a
zero effect on entry along the whole support of SIZE. This means that there is no
firm size-specific effect on the probability of entry.
From Figs. 4 and 5 we observe that in general there are no interaction effects
significantly different from zero and therefore no differences between potential
suppliers of different size categories in how they respond to green criteria in the
procurement process. There is, however, one exception. The middle graph in the
upper part of Fig. 4 shows that the larger the size of the potential supplier, the more
its probability of participating is negatively affected by the contracting authorities
demanding eco labeling––this applies up to about size category 9, which
corresponds to 500–999 employees. The overall impression of the effect of eco
labeling as illustrated in Fig. 4 and Table 3 could indicate that eco labeling mostly
attracts potential suppliers that belong to smaller size categories. The interaction
effects on the probability of bids being qualified are shown in Fig. 5; essentially the
reasoning for Fig. 4 applies here as well.
Finally, there are other variables presented in Table 3 that could be seen as
controls but are still interesting in the context of GPP as an environmental policy
instrument. Holding everything else constant, the probability of entry decreases
along with the number of potential suppliers as indicated by the coefficient in Model
1. This result is in line with the prediction of Li and Zheng (2009) and is explained
by the reduced probability of winning the contract in Eq. (1). The effect on the
number of qualified bids at the contract level (Model 2) is positive.34 However, the
statistically significant effect is small, and thus this variable has a very limited effect
on the number of qualified bids.
The overall conclusion is that taking environmental concerns into account when
allocating public contracts in the Swedish cleaning service sector generates little
response from the suppliers. That is, they generally do not adapt to the green criteria
that the contracting authorities specify in the call for tender and no significant
environmental impact should be expected. One explanation is simply that the
criteria are not stringent enough and, in this particular case, GPP is shown to be a
34 This might seem like a paradox but it is not. The estimation of the probability of entry includes both
outcomes (non-entry and entry), while the estimation of the number of bidders is the sum of individual
entry decisions only.
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weak environmental policy instrument. Furthermore, the results show that the
inclusion of green criteria adds complexity to the suppliers’ bid preparation process,
which is not promising from an environmental policy point of view. This
complexity could have been motivated if there was evidence that the green criteria
influence potential suppliers to invest in greener technologies. This is, according to
our findings, not the case. A natural question is whether our results are sensitive to
the measure of potential suppliers. In Appendix 3, we report estimates of the effects
of GPP on entry and number of qualified bids using all distinct bidders in the data
(Table 7). The results are broadly consistent across the two measures of potential
suppliers.
6 Summary and discussion
The public sector accounts for a significant part of the economy, and by integrating
environmental considerations into public procurement authorities are expected to
have the power to influence private producers to behave in less environmentally
damaging ways. This way of enacting environmental policies through GPP is
increasingly seen by politicians as a powerful environmental policy instrument, but
this lacks support in the academic literature.
If a procurement in which green criteria are stipulated only attracts already green
suppliers, a counteractive effect among private consumers might arise (Marron
1997). This is due to changes in the relative prices. When the public sector chooses
green instead of conventional products, price-sensitive private consumers will move
in the opposite direction. A solution to this problem would be to stipulate green
criteria that require potential suppliers to invest in greener technology. As recent
theoretical studies have demonstrated (Lundberg and Marklund 2011, 2013a),
unless suppliers with less green production choose to adapt, there will be at most a
relatively small reduction in emissions. Environmental policy via the entry
mechanism in public procurement is thus most likely weaker than the use of more
traditional instruments.
The environmental concerns, i.e., the green criteria, can appear as mandatory
qualification criteria or award criteria in which a bid with high environmental
standards earns extra points in comparison to other bids.
The aim of this paper has been to empirically study environmental concern in
public procurement with respect to potential suppliers’ decisions to participate in the
procurement process and to what extent green criteria affect the probability of
qualifying for a procurement. The study was conducted on Swedish regular cleaning
services data that is unique in that it contains very detailed information on the
environmental standards set by the contracting authorities.
The overall conclusion is that the design of GPP, which includes different
categories of green criteria, only has limited impact on the participation decision
and on the aggregate number of bidders. As such, GPP appears to have limited or no
potential to function as an environmental policy instrument. There is no support of
systematic self-selection with respect to firm size in relation to procurements with
different green criteria. The qualification process reveals that GPP is associated with
512 Environ Econ Policy Stud (2015) 17:487–520
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increased complexity as indicated by the reduced probability of a bid becoming
qualified when environmental management systems or regulation of chemical use is
the criterion.
Additionally, an interesting observation made in our analysis is that in none of
the procurements in which green criteria were specified we were able to identify
what specific environmental objective the criteria sought to address. This is
particularly interesting since the political ambitions to promote GPP as an
environmental policy instrument are extensive. Furthermore, in only 10 percent of
the procurements did the contracting authority plan to follow-up on the green
criteria. In combination with our empirical results, this shows that the political
ambitions for using GPP rest on shaky ground.
There is a substantial need for further empirical analysis to better understand how
to use GPP to the best benefit of society. For example, from an economics point of
view, weak incentives for adaption of environmentally less damaging technologies
in combination with an upward effect of GPP on price would be problematic. If
environmental concern in the allocation of public contracts has no or only minor
contribution to environmental improvements but comes at a higher cost, at least two
issues arise. First, the counteracting effect among private consumers identified in
Marron (1997) might very well take effect. Second, the price increase without the
intended environmental improvement would be synonymous to higher transaction
costs and green washing. This is a question for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix 1
See Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 4 Total number of criteria over all 337 procurements
Environmental criteria % Obs. Quality criteria % Obs.
1. Planned environmental revision 10 337 1. Insurance 45 337
2. Environmentally friendly brand, cleaning
products
61 337 2. Limited liability insurance 88 337
3. Swedish Environmental Management
Council (MSR)
24 337 3. Credit rating 74 337
4. Swedish Chemicals Agency B-list 17 337 4. Affidavit 49 337
5. Swedish Chemicals Agency O-list 6 337 5. Documentation from the Tax
Authority
58 337
6. Swedish Work Environment Authority
Chemicals
3 337 6. Annual report 32 337
7. The Swedish Environmental Code 21 337 7. Information on turnover 19 337
8. REACH 1 337 8. The firm has to provide a
bank deposit
1 337
9. Code of Statutes of the Swedish Chemicals
Agency 2008a
4 337 9. Experience required 85 337
10. Code of Statutes of the Swedish
Chemicals Agency 1994b
1 337 10. Provision of list of all earlier
jobs
4 337
11. Routines for bookkeeping of chemicals 42 337 11. References required 84 337
12. Provision of list of intended use of
chemicals
21 337 12. Original references required 11 337
13. Continuously updated list of chemicals 5 337 13. Foreman needs a cleaning
certificate
50 337
14. Environmental criteria, vehicles 3 337 14. Foreman needs equivalent
of a cleaning certificate
11 337
15. Environmental criteria, fuel 1 337 15. Foreman’s CV needs to be
provided
42 337
16. Eco driving 1 337 16. Swedish-speaking
employees
67 337
17. Plan for decreasing need for fossil fuel 2 337 17. Criminal records must be
provided
23 337
18. Allergy-friendly cleaning products 31 337 18. The firm must be connected
to a union
6 337
19. Swedish Chemicals Agency Code of
Statutes 2005
8 337 19. Firm must act as equivalent
to union terms
28 337
20. Non-allergenic substances as defined by
IFRA-norm
6 337 20. Plan of how to structure
work
60 337
21. Firm required to have an environmental
management system
60 337 21. Firm needs a quality plan 77 337
22. Firm required to have a documented
environmental management system
51 337 22. Firm needs a certified
quality plan
37 337
23. Firm required to have an environmental
certificate
30 337 23. Insta 800 14 337
24. ISO standard 14000 13 337 24. SIS 21 337
25. ISO standard 14001 24 337 25. ISO standard 9000 22 337
26. ISO standard 14024 1 337 26. Quality follow-up required 84 337





Environmental criteria % Obs. Quality criteria % Obs.
27. ISO standard 14025 1 337
28. EU eco classification of vehicles 1 337
a The Swedish Chemicals Agency’s Chemical Products and Biotechnical Organisms Regulations (KIFS
2008:2)
b Older version of KIFS 2008:2
Table 5 Definition of firm size
according to SCB’s definition
and class size frequency in data
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Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
EMS -0.419* 0.246 -0.254*** 0.081 -1.469*** 0.457
ECO 0.457* 0.243 -0.008 0.065 -0.181 0.434
VEH -0.048 0.359 0.329** 0.152 -1.491 2.172
CHEM 0.226 0.234 -0.042 0.066 -1.025** 0.440
MON 0.152 0.277 0.164 0.128 2.114** 0.977
OTHER 0.143 0.237 -0.084 0.073 -0.398 0.419
SIZE 0.260** 0.119 - - -0.031 0.310
EMS and SIZE 0.009 0.025 - - 0.112** 0.052
ECO and SIZE -0.046* 0.026 - - 0.011 0.051
VEH and SIZE 0.052 0.039 - - 0.187 0.300
CHEM and SIZE -0.032 0.028 - - 0.113** 0.051
MON and SIZE 0.025 0.030 - - -0.061 0.121
OTHER and SIZE -0.023 0.026 - - 0.018 0.052
MEAT (Yes = 1) 0.021 0.087 0.031 0.067 -0.124 0.177
#SUBC -0.008* 0.004 0.005* 0.003 0.087*** 0.028
ln (#SQMC) 0.078*** 0.030 0.077*** 0.022 -
MUNI (Yes = 1) 0.067 0.104 0.088 0.077 -0.248 0.194
FIN 0.145 0.278 -0.007 0.170 0.008 0.845
INS -0.120 0.130 -0.185* 0.107 -0.132 0.298
EXP -0.266* 0.161 -0.128 0.093 -1.068** 0.436
PER -0.718* 0.434 -0.125 0.180 1.414*** 0.543
SOC -0.042 0.092 0.010 0.074 0.146 0.200
STAF 0.338* 0.202 0.198 0.121 -0.659 0.438
SCHOOL (Yes = 1) -0.023 0.094 -0.006 0.068 - -
OFFICE (Yes = 1) 0.056 0.099 0.005 0.071 - -
OTHER (Yes = 1) -0.225** 0.088 -0.172** 0.070 - -
SERVICE -0.111*** 0.035 -0.071*** 0.025 0.019 0.075
Njm -0.013*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 -
LTD (Yes = 1) 1.957 1.346 - 3.538 2.535
HEADQ (Yes = 1) 1.228*** 0.116 - 0.309 0.259
ln (#SQMP) - - -0.232*** 0.075
njm - - -0.008 0.020
Potential supplier fixed effects Yes No Yes
Constant -4.300*** 1.231 1.405*** 0.305 3.033 2.116
lnalpha -3.506*** 0.630
Observations 30,000 722 1,861
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.080 0.260
Note that standard errors are clustered on procurement level in Model 1 and Model 2
* p\ 0.10, ** p\ 0.05, *** p\ 0.01
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Appendix 3: Robustness analysis of entry and number of qualified bidders
The empirical model of entry (Model 1) requires that we have a measure of potential
suppliers (Njm) for each contract. In the main analysis, we use the labor market area
(LMA) as the relevant area of commerce resulting in approximately 14 potential
suppliers per region on average. So, if a supplier submits a bid in a procurement in a
given LMA at least once during the sample period, it is defined as a potential
supplier in all procurements taking place in that particular region. Defining the set of
potential suppliers is challenging because the supplier might be interested in
contracts outside the geographical region, which is why we perform a robustness
check, as follows.We extend the set of potential suppliers to cover all suppliers
observed at least once in the sample. This measure results in Njm = 341 potential
suppliers.
As shown in Table 7, the results for the wider definition of potential suppliers are
broadly consistent with the findings in the main analysis. The estimated coefficient
on EMS is still negative but becomes statistically insignificant. Further, the
estimated coefficient on vehicles VEH does not alter the sign but becomes
statistically significant. That being said, this definition of potential suppliers could
be too wide and include potential suppliers that primarily are interested in contracts
in its nearest geographical area which motivates the use of the alternative definition.
When it comes to the regression specification for the number of qualified bidders
(Model 2), all six estimated coefficients now become statistically insignificant.
Note, however, that the variable Njm is invariant and drops out of the regression. We
argue that it is reasonable to control for potential suppliers when fitting a model to
the number of qualified bids.
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Coef. SE Coef. SE
EMS -0.057 0.278 -0.093 0.080
ECO 0.621** 0.292 0.108 0.066
VEH -0.794** 0.370 0.077 0.166
CHEM 0.318 0.283 -0.069 0.073
MON -0.082 0.268 0.109 0.153
OTHER -0.057 0.286 -0.066 0.075
SIZE 0.260* 0.144 - -
EMS & SIZE -0.063* 0.036 - -
ECO & SIZE -0.091** 0.038 - -
VEH & SIZE 0.166*** 0.050 - -
CHEM & SIZE -0.028 0.040 - -
MON & SIZE 0.044 0.038 - -
OTHER & SIZE -0.007 0.039 - -
MEAT (Yes = 1) -0.050 0.088 0.074 0.072
#SUBC 0.001 0.004 0.006* 0.003
ln (#SQMC) 0.055* 0.031 0.091*** 0.025
MUNI (Yes = 1) 0.111 0.119 0.127 0.081
FIN 0.203 0.329 0.023 0.175
INS -0.213 0.171 -0.232** 0.113
EXP 0.022 0.183 -0.225 0.139
PER -0.518 0.382 -0.169 0.248
SOC 0.064 0.097 0.020 0.080
STAF 0.126 0.189 0.350*** 0.123
SCHOOL (Yes = 1) -0.026 0.096 -0.031 0.072
OFFICE (Yes = 1) 0.140 0.102 -0.004 0.077
OTHER (Yes = 1) -0.108 0.082 -0.211*** 0.071
SERVICE 0.022 0.037 -0.096*** 0.029
LTD (Yes = 1) 4.454*** 1.423 - -
HEADQ (Yes = 1) 2.880*** 0.142 - -
Potential supplier fixed effects Yes No
Constant -8.983*** 1.293 1.442*** 0.375
lnalpha -2.577*** 0.337
Observations 180,090 722
Pseudo R2 0.410 0.039
Note that standard errors are clustered on procurement level in Model 1 and Model 2
* p\ 0.10, ** p\ 0.05, *** p\ 0.01
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